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Romania is experiencing a rather paradoxical situation: while its balance of payments reflects a severe need of financing 
and capitalisation, the first EU Alert Mechanism Report demonstrates the vulnerable macroeconomic external position of 
Romania and the EU allocation for the 2007-2013 programming period potentially provided a significant amount of money 
for investments, around 29 billion euro through Structural Funds, the level of absorption, after five years since the 
beginning of the current financial framework, remains extremely low. The paper focuses on the main Romanian 
macroeconomic imbalances, the current account balance, international investment position and on the most important 
sources for financing investments and development, the EU financial structural instruments: ERDF and Cohesion Fund. 
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1. Introduction 
When the financial crisis hit Europe, Romania was one of the most exposed countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe CEE. Before 2008, the very rapid growth which stimulated the domestic demand was mainly 
the effect of foreign direct investments and capital inflows facilitated by foreign banks with subsidiaries in 
Romania. As a result of the reduction of capital inflows and sharp decline in export demand, the previous pace 
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of growth has proved unsustainable and a very severe recession hit Romanian economy in the late of 2008 
Dragan,G., 2011. In order to avoid a possible banking sector collapses in CEE, the EU, the IMF and other 
International Financial Institutions EBRD, EIB and the World Bank Group created a new financial facility 
called EU Balance of Payment Facility BOPF. Consequently, Romania, Hungary and Latvia, all of them non-
euro EU member-states facing problems resulting from unusual combination of external shocks and 
domestic policy mistakes , received a common financial support package of billion. Romania 
signed its first agreement of multilateral financial assistance in May 2009 for an overall amount of 20 billion 
euro and an additional one in May 2011, for around 5 billion euro. 
The first Alert Mechanism Report on macroeconomic imbalances in the EU member states, published by the 
European Commission in February 2012, demonstrates the vulnerable macroeconomic external position of 
Romania, which surpasses the indicative threshold in three out of ten indicators, all of them from the area of 
external imbalances and competitiveness. However, although the FDI inflows in Romania have decreased due 
to prolonged economic recession of Western Europe, the EU funds allocated to our country for the 2007-2013 
financial period should have had a visible impact on the Romanian BoP, offsetting this drop and supporting the 
external sustainability of the country. Unfortunately, the contracted and payment ratio are still very low in 
Romania comparing with the CEE average. Romania  poor absorption of EU funds represents a multifaceted 
reality, the causes ranging from a weak administrative capacity, managing structures and rules too complicated, 
inefficient procedures, institutions, etc., to the lack of co-financing, respectively of guaranteeing the national 
contribution, as a result of an acute shortage of financial resources both for public and private co-financing 
investments. 
2. Macroeconomic imbalances in the  
The European Commission EC - Alert Mechanism Report on macroeconomic imbalances in the EU member 
states, published in February 2012, is based on a scoreboard including indicators and thresholds and represents 
the first phase of the new EU surveillance procedure and part of the so- main 
goal is to allow the EC to find out internal and external imbalances of the analyzed countries and, if it is the 
case, to propose policy recommendations, either under the preventive or the corrective arm of the procedu
AMR, 2012. The report demonstrates the vulnerable macroeconomic external position of Romania, which 
surpasses the indicative threshold in three out of ten indicators, all of them from the area of external imbalances 
and competitiveness, specifically on the current account balance, international investment position and nominal 
unit labor costs Table 1. 
The Report shows that a
has 
 in most of the EU member states, particularly in those EU countries which entered the recession 
with large current account deficits AMR, 2012. Consequently, the high current account deficits decreased in 
the majority of EU member states. However, there are a number of EU member states, and among them 
Romania, where the scoreboard indicator on the current account balance CAD has been surpassed. 
Nevertheless, even if the AMR threshold of 4%/ +6% as a % 
of GDP has been slightly exceeded in Romania, where the average is - 6.6 %, the situation is even worse for 
countries like Bulgaria -11.1%, Greece -12.1%, Cyprus -12.1% and Portugal -11.2%. 
external deficit the CAD declined from a peak of around 13% in 2007 to an average of around 
4% since 2009 and, according to the 2012 European Commission Spring  Forecast, it will remain below 5% of 
GDP in the next period 2012-2013 EC Spring Forecast, 2012. The decrease of CAD over the past three years 
was mainly the result of a significantly decrease of trade deficit, due to a sharper decline of imports on the back 
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Table 1  MIP scoreboard for 2010 
External imbalances and competitiveness 
3 years average of 




% change (3 ys) of Real 
Effective Exchange Rate 
with HIPC deflators 
5 change (5 ys) in 
Export Market Shares 
% change (3 ys) in 
Nominal ULC 
EU Thresholds 
-4/+6% -35% +/-5% & +/- 11% -6% +9% & +12% 
The Romania MIP scoreboard 
-6.6 -64.2 -10.4 21.4 22.1 
Internal imbalances 
% y-o-y change in 
deflated House Prices 
Private Sector credit 
Flow (% of GDP) 
Private Sector Debt 
(% of GDP) 
Public Sector Debt (% 
of GDP) 
3 years average of 
Unemployment 
EU Thresholds 
+6% 15% 160% 60% 10% 
The Romania MIP scoreboard 
-12.1 1.7 78 31 6.6 
Source: Author, on the base of the EC, Alert Mechanism Report, p.4 
Theoretically speaking, the potential vulnerability created by the current account deficits could be 
diminished if these deficits are financed through relatively secure means, such as FDI or capital transfers, 
including capital inflows from the EU funds. In a balance of payment, the financial account shows how an 
 are financed: i  investment, the surplus must be 
reflected in net financial outflow or net financial investment in the rest of the world and if an 
savings are less than its investment, the economy will be a net importer of nonfinancial assets from the rest of 
the world and these net imports should be financed by a net financial inflow from the rest of the world IMF 
textbook, 1996. According to the evolutions registered by the s, the net FDI has 
sharply decreased as a result of the crisis and uncertainty felt by the foreign investors, from a peak of 8.9% in 
2006 to less than 2% after 2010, Convergence Report 2012. However, th
including financial derivatives remained positive during the crisis due to loans from IMF and EU a substantial 
official international BoP assistance totaling up to 20 billion euro was provided to Romania between 2009-
2011 and, in spring of 2011, an additional programme, accessible until early 2013, was made available to 
Romania. However, at the same time, the level of gross external debt, has significantly increased, from about 
40% of GDP in 2006 to more than 70% after 2010 as a result of disbursements of international financial 
assistance and international bond issues in June 2011, a first euro-denominated issuance of 5-year bonds and in 
January 2012, a new US dollar-denominated issuance of 10-years bonds. 
The negative international investment position has deteriorated as well, from -37% of GDP in 2006 to above 
60% of GDP after 2009. The negative situation in the net international investment position NIIP is occurring 
financial liabilities exceed financial assets  assets consisting of claims 
on nonresidents and of monetary gold and SDRs held by the monetary authorities  IMF textbook, 1996. The 
AMR scoreboard shows that the net international investment positions, calculated as a % in the GDP, have 
current account deficits and also weak growth dynamic AMR, 2012. All new EU member states from CEE 
and some of the vulnerable older EU member states Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland exceed the indicative 
threshold of -35%. However, the degree of vulnerability is lower if the percentage of liabilities in GDP 
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respectively, the net external debt that require repayment of principal or interest is low. At the moment, 
Romania registers a level of 38.3% of NED in GDP, as a result of a still low level of indebtedness.  The risk to 
see this indicator rising on medium term is a real one, as well as the current account crisis converting into a 
public finance crisis, as the structure of the foreign debt is changing from private to public. Total external debt 
was up from 54% of GDP in 2008 to 70% in 2010, and is estimated to reach 82% in 2011, while total public 
debt increased from 20% of GDP in 2008 to 30% in 2009 and about 40% in 2010 Constantin & all, 2011. 
Hence, although the FDI inflows in Romania have decreased due to prolonged economic recession of 
Western Europe, the EU funds allocated to our country for the 2007-2013 financial period could have had a 
visible impact on the Romanian BoP, offsetting this drop and supporting the external sustainability of the 
country. rom 
a higher absorption of EU funds, while supported by the precautionary EU-
Convergence Report, p.140. The following section will focus on some evolutions concerning the EU funds 
absorption in Romania. 
3. A general overview -2013 
Romania is experiencing a rather paradoxical situation: while the macroeconomic indicators reflects a 
severe need of financing and, potentially speaking, there is an important amount of EU money at its disposal 
for different category of investments from infrastructure in transport and environment to human resources, so 
far Romania has not been able to take advantage of it.  
According to the latest KPMG report May, 2012 on the absorption of the EU funds, at 31 December 2011 
Romania occupied the last position among the CEE countries, both in terms of contracted and paid grants. 
Specifically, of the 23.25 billion Euro allocated for the 2007-2013 programming period, the contracted amount 
was 14.61 billion 63% and the EC disbursement of 3.15 billion Euro 14%, KPMG Report, 2012. On the other 
better absorption of EU funds by national authorities  and, at the same time a 
closer involvement of banks in the selection, prefinancing and co-financing of structural funds projects  could 
have  generated new business opportunities and thus contributed to the recovery of the Romanian economy 
Dragan, 2011. 
Table 2. The situation of EU funds absorption in CEE countries at 31 December 2011 
Country Available budget 
2007-2013 (bn euro) 
Contracted grants 
(bn euro/ %) 
Paid grants 
(bn euro/%) 
TOTAL (10 CEE) 209,14 139,87/ (67%) 60,84 / (29%) 
Bulgaria 8,02 6,33 / (79%) 1,51 / (19%) 
Czech Republic 30,77 22,20 / (72%) 11,86 / (39%) 
Estonia 4,10 3,85 / (94%) 1,81 / (44%) 
Hungary 29,32 18,84/ (64%) 8,33 / (28%) 
Latvia 4,94 4,27/ (87%) 2,15 / (44%) 
Lithuania 7,43 5,80 / (78%) 3,23 / (43%) 
Poland 82,87 52,44 / (63%) 23,09 / (28%) 
Romania 23,25 14,61 / (63%) 3,15 / (14%) 
Slovakia 13,6 8,66 / (64%) 3,84 / (28%) 
Slovenia 4,82 2,86 / (59%) 1,84 / (38%) 
Source: KPMG Report, 2012, 
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For the 2007-2013 programming period, the overall EU financial support from the ERDF and Cohesion 
Fund amounts to an average of around 0.3% of EU GDP per year, with variation from 0.01% for Luxembourg 
or 0.02% in Denmark to around 3% or just over in each of the three Baltic States and Hungary Expert 
evaluation, 2012. For CEE countries, the percentage is somewhere between 2 and 3% or below 2% in Romania 
and Slovenia Table 3. In relation to the government capital expenditure, which might be at least indicative of 
capital expenditure on regional development, the proportion is much larger over 25% of such expenditure in all 
CEE countries, with lower levels in Slovenia and Romania, of 25-27%, and more significant levels in Baltic 
States and Hungary, between 40% and 68%. 
Table 3. Allocation of ERDF and Cohesion Fund to Member States, 2007-2013 (average per year) 
  Allocation 2007-2013 Funding remaining 2012-2015 
  EUR Million % GDP 
% Govt. capital 
expenditure % GDP 
% Govt. capital 
expenditure 
Bulgaria 5,488.2 2.18 42.7 2.88 56.6 
Czech Republic 22,475.2 2.15 31.7 2.74 40.4 
Estonia 3,011.9 3.01 62.4 3.08 64.0 
Latvia 3,947.3 3.14 41.2 3.68 48.3 
Lithuania 5,747.2 2.98 58.3 2.71 53.0 
Hungary 21,292.1 3.13 68.3 3.53 77.0 
Poland 55,514.7 2.24 35.5 2.44 38.6 
Romania 15,528.9 1.82 27.3 2.67 40.2 
Slovenia 3,345.3 1.35 25.4 1.46 27.5 
Slovakia 9,998.7 2.17 59.0 2.72 73.8 
Source: Expert evaluation network delivering policy analysis on the performance of Cohesion Policy 2007-2013. Synthesis of national 
reports 2011, Belgium, February 2012 
On the other hand, the annual amounts remaining  for the period 2012-2015of the period are larger in 
relation to government capital expenditure in 2010, since the latter is assumed to be spread over 7 year and the 
former over the remaining two years of the period plus two additional years to allow for the n+2 rule. In this 
case, the remaining funding amounts to at least 40% of government capital expenditure a year, in all CEE 
countries apart from Poland, where it is just under 40% and Slovenia with 28%. Romania had one of the lowest 
proportions of ERDF and CF allocations over the period 2007-2013, respectively less than 2 % of GDP only 
Slovenia had a even smaller percentage. 
Although the mentioned figures give us only an approximate indication of the size of EU funding in relation 
to the overall spending on regional development, they draw attention to its critical importance in this regard. In 
conclusion, the figures set out above reinforce the remark that for many EU countries the ERDF and the 
Cohesion Fund are critical sources for financing the development expenditure over the remainder of the 
programming period. 
4. Conclusion 
Dealing with severe internal structural problems nefficient institutions and economy, demographic decline, 
etc. and a poor crisis management one of the most debated measure during the first stateges of the crises, the 
cut of salaries for the public sector, has mainly determined a sharp reduction of purchasing power and living 
standards of the population, reduction of internal demand and, finally, deepening of the crisis, the time is now 
for Romania to rediscover the utility of the EU Structural Funds. The most important external impulse for 
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economic growth, even at the eleventh hour, might only come from the EU Funds, provided that Romania 
rapidly solve its constant and become able to spend the remaining allocated funds. 
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